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THE enactment of legislation empowering the Supreme Court of the
United States to prescribe rules of pleading, practice and procedure in
federal criminal trials represents the fulfillment of long cherished heliefs
of law reformers that judicial procedure in criminal (as well as in civil)
cases should be formulated by the judges themselves. The subsequent
appointment of an Advisory Committee to submit a draft of proposed
rules seems to render desirable at this time a reconsideration of some
of the vexed problems relating to the rules of evidence governing crim-
inal proceedings in federal courts.
What are the sources of the present rules? In what respects have
they been affected by existing legislation and by the course of judicial
decision? How well have they worked in practice? Since the desire for
uniformity was doubtless one of the principal motivating factors in the
passage of the recent legislation, to what extent should the uniformity
principle be translated into concrete form by the draft makers when
they tackle problems relating to evidence? Would it be desirable, for
example, to formulate a separate complete federal code of evidence?
If not, would the formula embodied in Rule 43(a) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure be serviceable in criminal cases as well? Or is it
still feasible to have conformity to state law with resulting diversities
among judicial districts? These are practical problems difficult of solu-
tion. It is in the hope, however, that a reexamination of the more
pertinent available material on the subject may at least point the way
to tentative answers that the present paper has been written.
I.
An understanding of the historical development of the present federal
evidence rules in criminal trials seems a necessary prerequisite to their
evaluation. Irregular and sporadic development from principles of con-
formity with state practice to a broad policy of uniformity among federal
districts has carried them through a maze of ambiguous and conflicting
judicial and legislative pronouncements.
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The question whether state rules of evidence should be followed in
trials in federal courts taxed the ingenuity of the founding fathers. The
division of sovereignty between the state and the nation seemed to justify
the adoption of a uniform body of evidence law applicable to all federal
judicial districts. On the other hand, since there was no separate physi-
cal territory within which the jurisdiction of the newly created courts
was exclusive, federal trials would necessarily be conducted by members
of state bars familiar with local statutes and decisions and steeped in
local tradition. Pragmatic considerations thus made desirable the adop-
tion of the principle of conformity to state rules of evidence. This solu-
tion of the problem, at all events, was the one preferred by Congress
in 1789. The Rules of Decision Act provided that "the laws of the
several States, except where the Constitution, treaties, or statutes of the
United States otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules
of decision in trials at common law, in Courts of the United States, in
cases where they apply."' The conformity principle was continued and
expanded in a series of subsequent enactments.
2
But did the phrase "trials at common law," used in these Acts, in-
clude criminal prosecutions? In United States v. Reid,' decided in 1851,
this question was answered in the negative. The Supreme Court was
here called upon to determine whether, in a trial in a federal court in
Virginia for murder committed upon the high seas, a person jointly
indicted with the accused, but separately tried, was competent to testify
for the defense. Under a Virginia statute, adopted in 1849, such a
witness was competent. This statute was held not to apply, however,
on the ground that the requirement of conformity in "trials at common
law" did not include criminal cases. The Court concluded that state
legislation subsequent to 1789 should not govern the rules of evidence
in federal criminal trials. The applicable rule was held to be the "law
of the state, as it was when the courts of the United States were estab-
lished by the Judiciary Act of 1789."' The Court thought it obvious
that "the only known rule upon the subject which can be supposed to
have been in the minds of the men who framed these Acts of Congress,
was that which was then in force in the respective States, and which
they were accustomed to see in daily and familiar practice in the State
Courts."' 5 This view was confirmed, in the Court's judgment, by the
provisions of Section 29 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 which "refers
its courts and officers to the laws of the respective States for the quali-
1. IEv. STAT. §721 (1878), 28 U. S. C. § 725 (1940).
2. REv. STAT. §858 (1878), 28 U. S. C. §631 (1940); REv. STAT. §862 (1878),
28 U. S. C. § 637 (1940) ; Ry. STAT. § 914 (1878).
3. 53 U. S. 361 (1851).
4. Id. at 363.
5. Id. at 365.
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fications of jurors and the mode of selecting them."" The Court either
disregarded or overlooked the fact that this section of the Act had been
repealed in 1840 by a statute which imposed upon federal courts the
state rules from time to time in force.7 The exclusion of the witness
was approved on the ground that under the Virginia law of 1789 he
was incompetent. As a consequence of the decision in the Reid case,
therefore, federal criminal trials were left unaffected by principles of
conformity with existing state law - a result characterized by Wigmore
as "singular and indefensible."
8
The Reid case left unsolved the problem of the law applicable to
criminal proceedings in states admitted to the Union after 1789. In
Logan z. United States,9 decided in 1892, the Supreme Court was asked
to determine the competency of two witnesses, who had been convicted
of felonies in state courts, to testify on behalf of the government. The
case had been tried in a federal district court in Texas; one of the
witnesses had been convicted of homicide in North Carolina and had
served his sentence, the other had been convicted of two larcenies in
Texas and subsequently pardoned. The Court held that the English
common law in force at the time of the admission of Texas into the
Union determined the competency of the witnesses. Following the doc-
trine of the Reid case, the Court said that the provisions of the Com-
petency of Witnesses Act"0 to the effect that "the laws of the state in
which the trial is held shall be the rules of decision as to the competency
of witnesses in the Courts of the United States in trials at common
law" had no application to criminal trials. Consequently a Texas statute
enacted in 1858, making such witnesses incompetent, did not govern the
matter. The Court fell back on a statute enacted by the Republic of
Texas in 1836 making applicable to evidentiary questions "the common
law of England, as now practiced and understood."'" Consideration of
the principles of the common law led the Court to conclude that both
witnesses were competent: the North Carolina convict because the dis-
qualification did not apply beyond the limits of that state and the Texas
convict because his incompetency had been removed by a pardon.
But in Benson v. United States,2 decided only some eight months
after the Logan case, the Court began to shift its rationale. The case
again presented the question of the competency to testify of a person
jointly indicted with the defendant but whose separate trial had been
6. 53 U. S. 361 at 365, 366 (1851).
7. Act of July 20, 1840, 5 STAT. 394.
S. 1 WIGMO1E, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) § 6(4).
9. 144 U. S. 263 (1892).
10. REv. STAT. §85S (1878), 28 U. S. C. §631 (1940).
11. 1 REPUBLIC OF TEXAS LAWS (1838) 156.
12. 146 U. S. 325 (1892).
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ordered. Here, however, the witness had been called by the prosecution
instead of by the defense. It was urged that the point had already been
virtually decided in the Reid case. The Court took the position, however,
that that case was not decisive, since considerations of public policy
which justified the exclusion of a defendant as a witness for his co-
defendant were not present in the case at bar. In speaking for the Court
Mr. Justice Brewer said: "We do not feel ourselves, therefore, pre-
cluded by that case from examining this question in the light of general
authority and sound reason."13 Upon examination of the common law
precedents, the Court pointed out that for fifty years the tendency had
been to enlarge the domain of competency. This development, it was
noted, had been wrought partially by legislation, both state and federal,
and partially by judicial construction. The spirit of this legislation had
controlled the decisions of courts and the technical barriers which had
excluded witnesses from the stand had gradually been swept away. The
Court, while recognizing some conflict in the authorities, concluded that
the better common law view favored the competency, for the prosecu-
tion, of a co-indictee, although such testimony had been excluded in
the Reid case when offered for the defense.
What was the scope and significance of the decision in the Benson
case? Was it intended to alter the rule of the Reid and Logan cases
that federal criminal courts must apply the law of the state as it existed
in 1789 or at the time of the state's admission into the Union? In a
careful discussion of the problem Professor Leach has answered this
question in the negative. 4 In all three cases, he points out, state statutes
were ignored; in all three the weight of common law authority was
examined and applied, either because it had been adopted by statute or
because it was assumed that the law of the state at the time was in
accordance with common law precedents. In the Reid case it was ex-
pressly held that the common law of the state where the trial was held
13. 146 U. S. 325, 335 (1892) (Italics supplied). The trial was held in the Circuit
Court of the United States for the district of Kansas. A Kansas territorial statute
[KAN. TERR. STAT. (1855) c. 96, § 1] had adopted the common law of England. This
statute was ignored in the opinion.
14. See State Law of Evidence in the Federal Courts (1930) 43 HAUv. L. REv. 554,
559. In commenting further on this case the author writes: "The language of the Benson;
opinion mystified the lower federal courts for twenty-five years. Most of them con-
tinued to apply the Logan and Reid cases. And, indeed, in another case arising in Texas, the
Supreme Court reaffirmed the Logan case without mention of Benson v. United States.
Some of the lower courts, on the other hand, considered that the general common law
was applicable, tempered by a policy toward the removal of the disqualification of wit-
nesses. And some frankly did not know." Id. at 559-60. The case decided by the
Supreme Court arising in Texas was Hendrix v. United States, 219 U. S. 79 (1911),
holding that the wife of a defendant was not competent to testify in the federal courts
on his behalf.
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at the time of its admission into the Union was applicable. While no
similar declaration was made in the Benson case, in their decision in the
Logan case, only eight months earlier, the same judges had reaffirmed
the language of the Reid case. In the Benson case, Professor Leach
argues, the Court was confronted with some conflict in the common
law precedents and therefore felt it necessary to fortify its conclusion
by reference to, and reliance upon, the trend of recent legislation and
judicial decisions.
This argument is persuasive. A dozen years before it was made,
however, the Supreme Court had taken a different view of things.
In its decision in Rosen v. United States,"5 holding that a witness called
by the government who had previously been convicted of forgery in a
state court was competent to testify in a trial in a federal district court
of New York, the Court maintained that the Reid decision had been
"severely shaken" by the Logan and Benson cases. In stressing the
dictum of the Benson case that such questions should be examined "in
the light of general authority and of sound reason" the Court concluded
that the "dead hand of the common-law rule of 1789" should cease
to be controlling."0 Justices Van Devanter and McReynolds dissented
from so much of the opinion as departed from the rule of the Reid
and Logan cases, declaring that it was "in no way modified by what
actually was decided in Benson v. United States.""7
Insofar as it sanctioned progressive leadership by the courts of the
nation in a field where leadership is sorely needed, the decision in the
Rosen case is certainly defensible. As Dean Wigmore has pointed out,
the effect of the decisions in the Reid and Logan cases was to cause
the federal rules for criminal trials to be governed by "an artificial and
unpractical test, which. merely created needless obscurity and complica-
tion.""8 For a century the outworn common law rules of incompetency
had been undergoing a process of piecemeal statutory revision. Congress
having failed to provide much-needed relief through legislation, the
Court took things into its own hands. The unfortunate aspect of the
opinion, however, lay in the fact that its language was too vague and
cabalistic to constitute a helpful guide for the future."0 It was well
enough to inveigh against the "dead hand of the common-law rule of
1789," but what was the significance of such phrases as "the trend of
congressional opinion" and "the very great weight of judicial author-
15. 245 U. S. 467 (1918).
16. Id. at 470-72.
17. Id. at 473.
18. 1 WrIG.ORE. EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) § 6(4).
19. In the lower federal courts there was much confusion. Two circuits hesitatinglV
recognized the authority of the Rosen case and four circuits adhered to the old rule. See
WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 18, at § 6(4), n. 15; § 6b.
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ity"? Which of the many modern trends and innovations would receive
judicial sanction in the future? Was the Court prepared to assume
active leadership in the movement for reform or would it trim and com-
promise and continue to look to Congress for guidance?
Speaking for the Court only a year later, Mr. Justice Holmes used
language which gave some hope: "It is argued that the Court was bound
by the rules of evidence as they stood in 1789. That those rules would
not be conclusive is sufficiently shown by Rosen v. United States . "20
But shortly afterward in Jin Fuey Moy v. United States,21 holding that
a federal district court in Pennsylvania did not err in excluding the
defendant's wife as a witness on his behalf, the Court reverted to the
rationale of its earlier holdings. In speaking for the Court, Mr. Justice
Pitney said:
"But a single point remains- hardly requiring mention - the
refusal to permit defendant's wife to testify in his behalf. It is
conceded that she was not a competent witness for all purposes, a
wife's evidence not having been admissible at the time of the first
Judiciary Act, and the relaxation of the rule in this regard by Sec.
858, Rev. Stats., being confined to civil actions. Logan v. United
States . . ; Hendrix v. United States. . . . But, it is said
the general rule does not apply to exclude the wife's evidence in
the present case because she was offered not 'in behalf of her
husband,' that is, not to prove his innocence, but simply to con-
tradict the testimony of particular witnesses for the government
who had testified to certain matters as having transpired in her
presence. The distinction is without substance. The rule that
excludes a wife from testifying for her husband is based upon her
interest in the event, and applies irrespective of the kind of testi-
mony she might give."
' 22
Once again we have the Court harking back to the law in 1789 as a
source of a rule of evidence, in the absence of congressional modifica-
tion, and omitting all reference to the Rosen decision. Indeed, if the
view announced in the Rosen case were still viewed with favor, it is
difficult to understand the result in the Jin Fuey Moy decision.2
The confused state of affairs resulting from these contradictory lucu-
brations of the judicial mind was worse confounded by the opinion in
Olmstead v. United States,24 decided eight years later. The Court held
that evidence obtained by federal .agents through the tapping of telephone
20. Greer v. United States, 245 U. S. 559, 561 (1918).
21. 254 U. S. 189 (1920).
22. Id. at 195.
23. The most reasonable explanation of the decision is that presented by Mr. Jus-
tice Sutherland in speaking for the Supreme Court in Funk v. United States, 290 U. S.
371, 386-87 (1933), to be discussed infra p. 771.
24. 277 U. S. 438 (1928).
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wires was not a search or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment and was admissible in a prosecution for violation of the
National Prohibition Act. Noting the fact that this method of obtaining
evidence was a misdemeanor under the Washington law, the Court
through Chief justice Taft observed:
"Vhile a Territory, the English cominin law prevailed in Wash-
ington, and thus continued after her admission in 18,9. The rules
of evidence in criminal cases in courts of the United States sitting
there consequently are those of the conmion law. Uniled Staltes
v. Reid . . . ; Logan v. United States . . . ; Rosen T. United
States . . . ; IWithaup v. United States . . . ; Robinson v. United
States ..
"The common law rule is that the admissibility of evidence is nut
affected by the illegality of the means by which it was obtained.
"The common law rule must apply in the case at bar." - 5
Again, it would seem, the Court meant to go back to the rule of the
Reid and Logan cases. But why the Chief Justice chose to cite the
Rosen case for the proposition that the rules of evidence in federal
criminal trials are governed by the law of the state where the trial
occurs at the time of its admission into the Union is a mystery. Of the
two other cases cited, Withaup v. United States' held that the state law
at the time of admission to the Union governs, while Robinson v. United
States2 7 rejected such a test on the ground that "much that was said"
in the opinion in United States v. Reid "has been weakened by the later
decision of Rosen v. United States."'  The net effect of the Jin Fucy
Moy and Olnistead decisions was to add enormously to the general con-
fusion and uncertainty among the lower federal courts in their efforts
to determine what rules of evidence should govern in criminal prose-
cutions.29
In Funk z. United States," however, the Supreme Court contributed
a substantial doctrinal clarification. In holding that the wife of a de-
fendant in a criminal trial in a federal court is a competent witness in
his behalf the Court reverted unequivocally to the reasoning of the
Benson and Rosen cases, repudiated the principles of the Reid and Logan
25. 277 U. S. 438, 466-68 (1928).
26. 127 Fed. 530 (C. C. A. 8th, 1903).
27. 292 Fed. 683 (C. C. A. 9th, 1923).
28. Id. at 687.
29. See I WIGo, mE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) §6a (pt. II: Criminal Caes) and
cases there cited; Leach, State Law of Evidcncc in the Federal Courts (1930) 43 Hav.
L. REv. 554, 565-66.
30. 290 U. S. 371 (1933), (1934) 43 YALE L. J. 849, (1934) 14 B. U. L RWv. 175,
(1934) 22 CALIF. L. REv. 448, (1934) 19 CORN. L. Q. 480, (1934) 47 HAnS'. L Rm . 853,
(1934) 28 ILL. L. REv. 846, (1934) 19 IoW. L. REv. 4,R, (1934) 82 U. or PA. L. RE".
406.
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cases and expressly overruled Hendrix v. United States"' and Bin Fucy
Moy v. United States. The importance of the opinion justifies substan-
tial quotation. After reviewing the Reid and Logan cases and noting
their influence on subsequent holdings, Mr. Justice Sutherland, speaking
for the Court, said:
"Taking the two cases together, it is plain enough that tile ulti-
mate doctrine announced is that in the taking of testimony in
criminal cases, the federal courts are bound by the rules of the
common law as they existed at a definitely specified time in the
respective states, unless Congress has otherwise provided.
"With the conclusion that the controlling rule is that of the com-
mon law, the Bengon case and the Rosen case do not conflict; but
both cases reject the notion, which the two earlier ones seem to
accept, that the courts, in the face of greatly changed conditions,
are still chained to the ancient formulae and are powerless to declare
and enforce modifications deemed to have been wrought in the
common law itself by force of these changed conditions ...
"In both cases the court necessarily proceeded upon the theory
that the resultant modification which these important considerations
had wrought in the rules of the old common law was within the
power of the courts to declare and make operative." 32
The Court concluded that the case at bar fell within the principles
of the Benson and Rosen cases. The opinion noted the fact that the
rules of the common law which disqualified as witnesses persons having
an interest had long since in the main been abolished both in England
and the United States. What was once regarded as a sufficient ground
for the exclusion of such testimony had come to be uniformly considered
as affecting merely its credibility. The Court pointed out that the modern
rule which has removed the disqualification from persons accused of
crime came into force gradually after the middle of the last century
and is today universally accepted."3
Meeting squarely the argument that the Court should continue to
enforce the old common law rule, no matter how contrary to modern
thought and experience and how opposed to the trend of legislation and
tb the weight of judicial opinion it might be, merely because Congress
had failed to legislate on the matter, the opinion declared that the duty
of the Court was to decide the question "in accordance with present-day
standards of wisdom and justice rather than in accordance with some
outworn and antiquated rule of the past."" Continuing, the Court said:
31. 219 U. S. 79 (1911). See note 14 supra.
32. 290 U. S. 371, 379-80 (1933).
33. The opinion stresses the fact that rules of evidence in their development "yield
to the experience" of succeeding generations. Id. at 380-81.
34. Id. at 382.
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"The final question to which we are thus brought is not that of
the power of the federal courts to amend or repeal any given rule
or principle of the common law, for they neither have nor claim
that power, but it is the question of the power of these courts,
in the complete absence of congressional legislation on the subject,
to declare and effectuate, upon common-law principles, what is the
present rule upon a given subject in the light of fundamentally
altered conditions, without regard to what has previously heen
declared and practiced. It has been said o often as to have iecome
axiomatic that the common law is not immutable but flexible, and
by its own principles adapts itself to varying conditions. .. .""
In overruling Jin Fuey Maloy -,. United States the Court pointed *'ut
that in that case defense counsel had conceded that the wife was not a
competent witness for all purposes, but contended that her testimony
was admissible in that instance because she was offered not to prove her
husband's innocence but merely to contradict the evidence of government
witnesses who had testified to certain matters as having transpired in
her presence. This distinction had properly been held by the Court to
be without substance. It was apparent, said Mr. Justice Sutherland,
that in the Jin Fuey Moy case the point most in the mind of the Court
was the distinction relied upon, and not the basic rule which was not
contested. In other words, the question had not been properly presented
and was disposed of - to recall Mr. Justice Pitney's language- as one
"hardly requiring mention.""z
Shortly afterward, during the same term in which the Funk case was
decided, the Supreme Court found an opportunity to amplify its recent
pronouncement that modern standards of justice rather than obsolete
rules of the past should govern the admission of evidence in federal
criminal trials. In HWolflc v. United Statesar it reviewed a ruling of a
federal district court in Washington admitting in evidence against the
defendant in a criminal trial a statement contained in a letter from him
to his wife, but proved by the testimony of a stenographer, reading from
her notes, to whom the accused had dictated the letter. The ruling had
been upheld and the conviction sustained by the Circuit Court of
Appeals,38 which had adopted as the test of admissibility its interpre-
tation of the statute in force in the territory of Washington at the time
of its admission to statehood. In sustaining the conviction fie Supreme
Court expressly rejected the reasoning of the Circuit Court of Appeals
and said that the rules governing the competency of witnesses in federal
criminal trials "are not necessarily restricted to those local rules in force
35. Id. at 383.
36. Id. at 387. -McReynolds and Butler, JJ., dissented.
37. 291 U. S. 7 (1934).
38. Wolfle v. United States, 64 F. (2d) 566 (C. C. A. 9th, 1933).
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at the time of the admission into the Union of the particular state where
the trial takes place, but are governed by common law principles as in-
terpreted and applied by the federal courts in the light of reason and
experience," citing Funk v. United States.39 The Court further declared
that if any different rule with respect to the admissibility of testimony
had been thought to apply in federal courts, it was clear that it should
be the same as that governing the competency of witnesses. In other
words, the decision on the point raised, in the absence of pertinent Con-
gressional legislation, would be controlled by common law principles,
not by local statute. The Court pointed out that the statement to which
the witness was permitted to testify was a relevant admission evidencing
criminal intent and hence rightly received in evidence unless it should
have been excluded as a confidential communication by the husband to
his wife. In rejecting the claim of privilege, the Court through Mr.
Justice Stone said:
"... Normally husband and wife may conveniently coinmuni-
cate without stenographic aid, and the privilege of holding their
confidences immune" from proof in court may be reasonably enjoyed
and preserved without embracing within it the testimony of third
persons to whom such communications have been voluntarily re-
vealed. . . . The privilege suppresses relevant testimony, and
should be allowed only when it is plain that marital confidence
cannot otherwise reasonably be preserved. Nothing in this case
suggests any such necessity."
40
The Funk and Wolfle decisions seem to express the considered judg-
ment of the Court and to lay down a fixed policy for the future.4 1 As
regards both the competency of witnesses and the admissibility of testi-
mony, federal rules of evidence in criminal trials will, in the absence
of Congressional enactment, be governed by common law principles as
interpreted by the federal courts "in the light of reason and experience."
They will not be controlled by local statute. While the rules of evidence
will be decided according to the principles of the common law, in deter-
mining what rule shall govern, the Court will feel free to take cognizance
of altered conditions, the course of legislative change and the weight
of current judicial authority. The common law to which the Court
will look, therefore, is not the common law of the states in 1789 or at
the date of their admission into the Union or with reference to any
other fixed period of time, but a common law modernized and adjusted
to meet the tested needs of experience. To put the matter plainly, what
the Court has said is that the law of evidence in federal criminal trials
39. 291 U. S. 7, 12 (1934).
40. Id. at 16-17.
41. See, e.g., the subsequent reference to the Funk case in United States v. Wood,
299 U. S. 123, 144 (1936).
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today is whatever the judges, in their collective wisdom but with due
regard to modern trends, shall from time to time decide it to be.
Aside from the commendable achievement of the Court in escaping
finally from the bondage of antiquated rules no longer suited to current
needs, the chief significance of the two decisions lies in the triumph of
the uniformity principle. The clash between the opposing ideals of uni-
formity and conformity which gave us Szeift v. Tyson42 and Erie Rail-
road Corpany z,. Tompkins 3 in the domain of substantive law has been
resolved in favor of the former in the development of evidentiary rules
for federal criminal trials. The last vestige of the "static conformity
doctrine" of the earlier decisions has been swept away. And yet it may
well be asked whether substantial uniformity can be expected in future
decisions of the lower federal courts. MNuch of the confusion hereto-
fore existing in these courts has, it is true, been due to inconsistent and
uncertain pronouncements of the Supreme Court. While that tribunal
seems finally to have recognized its responsibilities and promises more
vigorous leadership in the future, it must be recalled that many important
cases never go higher than the circuit courts of appeals. With often
no standard except "reason and experience" to guide them, these court,
will doubtless continue to reach varying conclusions as to what consti-
tutes the better modern view on any specific evidentiary pr4,blem. The
result will be conflict and uncertainty until the issue is finally settled by
the Supreme Court, which may be a matter of years. The process of
judicial selection, clarification, delimitation and correction is at best a
slow one. Moreover, past experience demonstrates the importance of
stare decisis in this branch of the law. Courts have usually been reluc-
tant to disregard precedent in meeting new situations. Perhaps, there-
fore, it would be more accurate to say that the uniformity principle has
triumphed as a result of the Funk and Wolfl decisions only insofar
as that principle can triumph in the absence of more extended codifica-
tion. The path has at least been cleared for a progressive development
of evidence law in federal criminal trials.
II.
The desirability of both speed and certainty in the administration of
criminal justice has repeatedly been emphasized by legal reformers and
commentators. The funds of litigants are unnecessarily wasted by time-
consuming appeals in which parties find it advantageous to urge that the
trial courts erred in the admission or rejection of testimony. The dockets
of appellate courts should not be cluttered with cases which do not justify
42. 16 Pet. 1 (U. S. 1842).
43. 304 U. S. 64 (1938).
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appellate consideration on their merits. As we have seen, moreover, in
seeking to prevent undesirable results these courts have too often only
added to the general confusion. We come back, therefore, to the ques-
tion posed at the beginning of this paper: what provision, if any, should
be made in the Rules of Criminal Procedure in respect to the law of
evidence governing criminal trials in federal courts? Two proposals for
reform have struggled for supremacy in the legal literature of this
subject: (1) conformity to state law with some diversities among judi-
cial districts, and (2) the formulation and adoption of a separate complete
federal code of evidence for use in both criminal and civil cases. Let
us consider each of these suggestions in the light of the existing situation.
One of the leading arguments advanced in support of the first of these
proposals is based upon the existence of state bars familiar with local
statutes and state judicial decisions and well versed in local customs.
It is said that the learning of these practitioners should be utilized and
their convenience considered in the formulation of rules of evidence in
federal trials. It is pointed out that most of the progress achieved in
the development of the law of evidence to meet modern conditions has
come through forward-looking state legislation and the decisions of
state courts. A body of appellate court decisions interpreting local
statutes is already in existence and could be utilized in the federal prac-
tice. Against uniformity it may also be urged that two procedural
systems create instances in which divergent results are obtainable in the
same state. Under such reasoning the decisions in the Reid and Loyan
cases that federal criminal prosecutions are unaffected by the several
acts of Congress requiring conformity to state law should be repudiated.
Professor Leach, an advocate of the conformity solution, sums tip the
matter thus:
it... In diversity of citizenship cases, conformity would seem
clearly desirable. In the exclusive jurisdiction, it seems the best
way out of a difficult situation. The states have shown a laudable
tendency to advance, and the progress on the whole is generally
conceded to have been wise. State legislatures contain a large
number of members of the bar whose professional activities have
been interrupted, if at all, only temporarily in the interests of
politics. They keep a close eye on the administration of the courts,
and have a reasonably sound understanding of their problems. The
diversities between states, moreover, are not extensive. Some states
have been recognized leaders in the advance, but well-considered
and successful reforms have percolated throughout the Union with-
out unreasonable delay. The most marked example of this is the
reform toward removal of common law disqualifications of wit-
nesses with which the federal courts in criminal cases have had the
most difficulty. The boon to the state bar of a federal law of evi-
[Vol. 51 : 763
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dence conforming to state practice cannot, of course, lie over-
emphasized.""4
Answering the argument that conformity to state legislative and judicial
reforms in the law of evidence would put too great a burden of work
on federal judges who sit in several jurisdictions and must hence famil-
iarize themselves with divergent systems of state law, the author points
out that the hardship on the judge is no greater than the hardship placed
on the bar by absence of conformity, and probably less since c tinsel
have the duty of instructing the court on matters pertaining to local
law.4  Professor Leach is not impressed, moreover, with the suggestions
that it would be below the dignity of the United States to subject its
courts in matters of evidence to regulation by state law, and that state
statutes conceivably might obstruct federal criminal law enforcement.
Congress has already required its courts to apply state law in many fields
and that body surely has ample constitutional authority to prevent any
attempted frustration of the administration of federal criminal justice. 0
Conceding the merit of many of the points advanced in favor of
conformity, the solution seems no longer tenable. The Supreme Court
in 1933 in the Funk and Wolfle cases has taken its stand in support of
the uniformity principle. It is extremely unlikely that it will now,'
reverse its position and countenance general conformity to state law in
evidentiary matters in its forthcoming Rules of Criminal Procedure. 7
Furthermore, it is of significance that in the Rules of Civil Procedure
for the District Courts of the United States, adopted by the Supreme
Court in 1937 pursuant to the Act of 1934,"s the practice followed since
1872 of conformity in law actions to the procedure obtaining in the
44. Leach, State Law of Evidence in the Federal Courts (1930) 43 H.miv. L. REv.
554, 583-84. For another argument in support of conformity see N,,te (1934) 43 YAis
L. j. 849. The subject is also discussed in Callahan and Ferguson, Evidence and the
New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (193rj) 45 Y.%tx L. J. 622. 44-47; Sweeney,
Federal or State Rules of Evidence in Federal Courts (1932) 27 ILt L. REv. 344, 3971-.
45. Leach, supra note 44. at 584. The effect of the decision in Erie Railroad Co.
v. Tompkins has been to cast an added burden onl federal judges to familiarize themselves
with state substantive law.
46. Ibid.
47. Mr. Leach's article, it should be noted, was written a dozen years ago and before
the decisions in these cases. Moreover, Leach himself concedes that "if Congress would
provide a code of evidence and keep it modernized, a Utopian ideal would be realized."
See Leach, supra note 44, at 513.
48. 48 STAT. 1064 (1934), 28 U.S. C. §§723(b)&(c) (1940). Wigmre notes that
the desirability of this change was urged by the great majority uf those interested in fed-
eral procedure. He says further: "Those who urged this legislation relegating the wlole
subject to the rule-making power of the Supreme Court were agreed that a gtm, ral
change from the mutilated conformity policy N~ould eventually be advisable. Either the
Federal rules of Evidence should be developed unifurmly throughout the circuits and
independently of State rules, or else be made tu conform strictly to tle current State
19421
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
particular state was abandoned in favor of distinctive federal rules.
Independence and uniformity were substituted for partial conformity
to local procedural law. It is true, of course, that the epochal decision
in Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins,4" overruling Swift v. Tyson,"*
substituted complete conformity to local substantive law for partial
independence. Save in matters governed by the Federal Constitution
or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of
the state. And it is not a matter of federal concern whether the law of
the state is declared by its legislature in a statute or by one of its courts
in a decision. It is also of interest that Mr. Justice Brandeis, who was
alone among the justices in declining to approve the new rules of in-
dependent procedure, uniform for all the federal courts, wrote the
opinion in this milepost case which "abandoned the ideal of a uniform
nationwide common law of the states and recognizes the complete
autonomy of forty-eight systems of judge-made substantive law." tt The
seeming anomaly that at the same term of court the Supreme Court
should have adopted uniform rules of procedure while announcing a
doctrine of diversity in substantive law has evoked much interest and
discussion. 2 But however indistinct and illusory in practice the dividing
line between substance and procedure, it is well recognized that in the
latter sphere the federal courts act independently, except where federal
statutes or rules of court may prescribe conformity, partial or complete."
It is appropriate at this time to advert to the formula embodied in
Rule 43(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Members of the
Advisory Committee which drafted these rules, we are told, were re-
luctant to deal with the thorny problem of evidence. 4 Whether this
was due to lurking doubts as to the Supreme Court's power to control
practice (subject only to exceptions expressly formulated for Federal practice). II
either event, the Federal Supreme Court, and not Congress, was best qualified to bring
about exact conformity or to direct the detailed changes. Considerable merit was claimed
for each alternative,--complete uniformity or strict conformity." I WXVa.ro., EviD imrci
(3d ed. 1940) § 6b.
49. 304 U. S. 64 (1938).
50. 16 Pet. 1 (U. S. 1842).
51. McCormick & Hewins, The Collapse of "Gcneral" Law in the Federal Cotirts
(1938) 33 ILL. L. Rav. 126. This article contains an excellent discussion of the his-
torical background and implications of the decision.
52. See, e.g., Holtzoff, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Erie Railroad
Co. v. Tompkins (1940) 24 J. Amt. Jun. Soc. 57; Clark, The Tompkins Case and the
Federal Rules (1941) 24 J. Amt. JUD, Soc. 158.
53. McCormick & Hewins, supra note 51, at 142.
54. See PRocEEDiNGs OF THE CLEVELAND INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL RULES (1938) 186;
PROCEEDINGS OF THE ATLANTA INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL RULES (1938) 72; Mitchell, Atli-
rude of Advisory Committee-Events Leading to Proposal for Uniform Rules-Prols.
lems on Which Discussion is Invited (1936) 22 A. B. A. J. 780, 782.
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the subject-matter,5 or to the inherent difficulties involved, or to a dis-
inclination to precipitate objections in Congress from lawyers who might
take exception to particular provisions and hence delay adoption of the
rules, or-what is more likely- to a combination of all these factors,
need not now concern us. But apparently the Court's decision to have
the rules provide for unification of legal and equitable remedies in one
form of action caused the Committee to conclude that some provision
relating to evidence was essential." Rule 43 was the result. Subdivision
(a) provides for a limited conformity in that the local state rules are
to be followed in the trial court, unless a federal statute or court rule
is applicable. The wording is novel and far from clear:
Form and Admissibility. In all trials the testimony of witnesses
shall be taken orally in open court, unless otherwise provided by
these rules. All evidence shall be admitted which is admissible
under the statutes of the United States, or under the rules of evi-
dence heretofore applied in the courts of the United States on the
hearing of suits in equity, or under the rules of evidence applied in
the courts of general jurisdiction of the state in which the United
States court is held. In any case, the statute or rule which favors
the reception of the evidence governs and the evidence shall be
presented according to the most convenient method prescribed in
any of the statutes or rules to which reference is herein made.
The competency of a witness to testify shall be determined in like
manner.
The recent appearance of Professor Green's scholarly article discussing
the meaning and operation of this rule renders unnecessary its extended
consideration in this paper. 7 His conclusion -well fortified by docu-
mentation - is that the rule has not supplied that certainty which before
its adoption was thought to be the primary need of federal evidence.
Nor, in his judgment, has it furnished the simplicity and liberality so
55. See Wickes, The Nc, Rile-Making Power of the United States Supreme Court
(1934) 13 TFx. L. REv. 1; Sunderland, Character and Extent of the Ruie-Making Power
Granted U. S. Supreme Court and Methods of Effective Exercise (1935) 21 A. B. A. J.
404; Clark, Power of the Supreme Court to Make Rules of Appellate Procedure (1936)
49 THAv. L. RFv. 1303; Green, To What Extent May Courts Under the Rnie-Mabihg
Power Prescribe Rules of Evidence? (1940) 26 A. B. A. J. 4,2; Grinnell, To ihat
Extent May Courts Under the Rule-Makhing Power Prescribe Rules of Ezidence? (1940)
24 J. A. Jun. Soc. 41; Dean, Rule-Making for Criminal Procedure (1940) 24 J. Am.
JuTn. Soc. 81; Wignore, Legislature Has No Power in Procedural Field (1940) 24 J.
AM. JuD. Soc. 70.
56. See PROCEEDINGS OF CLEVELAND INSTITUTE (IN FEDMRL RULES (1938) 186; PRO-
CEEDINGS OF XVAS INGTON INSTITUTE AND Naw YORK SY!,1PsnTostt (1938) 229, 277;
Mitchell, Attitude of Advisory Conznittee-Events Leading to Proposal for Uniform
Rules-Problems on lVhich Discussion Is Invited (1936) 22 A. B. A. J. 780, 782.
57. The Admissibility of Evidence Under the Federal Rules (1941) 55 HAnv. L.
REv. 197.
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sorely needed in evidentiary matters generally. Its provisions concerning
federal statutes and state law do not aid materially in modernizing the
rules, since many of the badly needed evidence reforms have not been
adopted by Congress, by the federal courts nor by any large number
of states. The evidence decisions of federal courts do not disclose greater
liberality than those of the state courts. In the decisions of the lower
federal courts especially he notes instances of extreme conservatism.
He concludes as follows:
". .. The federal courts are following much the same doctrines
as before. Adequate improvement can come only through legisla-
tion, preferably by rules of court. There is some difference of
opinion concerning the amount of detail which a set of formulated
rules of evidence should contain. Perhaps the code now in prepara-
tion by the American Law Institute will furnish a starting point,
but this code will not be ready for several years. In the meantime
Rule 43 must be endured, and a better understanding of its pro-
visions is desirable. The fact that subdivision (a) is a makeshift,
however, should not be forgotten, and when its purpose as a stop-
gap has been served and a satisfactory substitute has been prepared,
the rpresent rule should be discarded." r s8
The unfavorable character of Professor Green's report affords no sur-
prise to those who expected little relief from the mystifying ambiguity
of this fumbling, if sincere, attempt to bring order out of chaos. We
must look elsewhere for a solution.
The desirability of a federal code of evidence has frequently been
urged, although the suggestion has usually been coupled with the ad-
mission that it represents a Utopian ideal."' The opportunity now
thought to be afforded ,to incorporate such a codification in the Federal
Rules of Court has stimulated further discussion of the possibilities
inherent in the project. The claim is advanced that such a code could
include recent meritorious legislative innovations and the more workable
proposals for the modernization and simplification of evidence law, and
could be revised and kept up to date by appropriate changes in the rules.
Divergent and outmoded judicial rulings could be corrected and the
number of time-consuming appeals on contested evidence points cur-
tailed. Codification would be advantageous for the lower federal judi-
ciary since it is customary to assign district judges temporarily to judicial
districts outside their home states, where their services may be needed
to relieve congested dockets. The federal specialties of bankruptcy and
58. Id. at 225.
59.. See the discussion of this subject in Sweeney, Federal or Stale Rules of Evi-
dence in Federal Courts (1932) 27 ILL. L. REv. 394, 399; Callahan & Ferguson, Evidence
and.the New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1936) 45 YALE: L. J. 622, 644-47; Leach,
State Law of Evidence in the Federal Courts (1930) 43 HAry. L. Rpv. 554, 583-84.
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patents could be uniformly and more satisfactorily administered through
the adoption of a uniform method of proof. The Supreme Court would
have the opportunity to assume effective leadership in a constructive
movement for legal reform in a branch of the law where leadership is
a pressing need. The case for uniformity was succinctly summarized a
few years ago by Mr. Wigmore:
"The truth is that the time seems to have come, for the rules of
evidence as for procedure in general, when the pristine principle
of conformity must be abandoned in the practice of the Federal
Courts. It is more important, under modern conditions, that Federal
practice all over the Nation should be uniformly consistent with
itself than that it should, by varying, conform chameleonlike to local
State practice. A general re-casting of the Federal rules of evidence
is therefore to be expected whenever the principle of Federal uni-
formuity finds full acceptance in legislation and in rules of Court." '
The fact that a distinguished group of experts in the law of evidence,
under the favorable auspices of the American Law Institute, are now
engaged in the Promethean task of formulating a model Code of Evi-
dence has given rise to the suggestion that their labors might be utilized
to good advantage in any attempt at federal codification. The group
responsible for this model code have recently submitted a second tentative
draft for the purpose of securing criticisms and suggestions for its im-
provement from all branches of the legal profession."' How long it
may take to complete this project is not known, but the finished product
will probably not be available for some time. It has been suggested
that it would be desirable for the Committee on the Rules of Civil
Procedure and the Committee on the Rules of Criminal Procedure to
meet with the Evidence advisory group in an endeavor to reacli a com-
mon ground. This is a constructive suggestion and one, it is hoped, that
will bear fruit.
The tremendous difficulties involved in drafting a model code that
can be expected to receive the approval and active support of practi-
tioners, judges and legal scholars are brought sharply into focus by the
recent adverse comments on the work of the American Law Institute
group by the most eminent writer and scholar of his generation in the
law of evidence. As noted above, fr. Wigniore fully recognizes the
desirability of substituting the ideal of uniformity for that of conformity
in the rules of evidence in federal trials. Nevertheless, writing in the
January issue of the American Bar Association Journal2 he expresses
vigorous opposition to the draft code finally formulated and offered to
60. WIGAIORE, SELECTED CASES ON EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1932) 1020.
61. THE A iFRIcA. LAW INSTITUTE CODE OF EVIDENCE (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1941).
62. The American Law histitute Code of Evidence Rues: .1 Dissent (1942) 23
A. B. A. J. 23.
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the Institute last May. He sets forth six postulates of method and style
on which he thinks it is desirable for the draftsmen of a code to agree,
The code submitted, in his judgment, "fails substantially to conform
sufficiently to any one of these postulates."' His disagreement, he notes,
is not so much with the policy of many of the code's rules as such
(although he thinks some of the specific rules do not go far enough
and others go too far) but rather with the draftsmanship. In conclusion
he says:
"Reviewing this cumulation of shortcomings, on the whole might
not a cold-hearted critic describe this Draft Code somewhat as
follows: 'This is an academic composition, meritorious as a record
of aspirations, and highly significant as a symptom that Bench and
Bar are ready for considerable progress; but not meriting legisla-
tive favor, first because its advanced proposals are far too radical
at the present time, and secondly because its imperfections in the
formulation of the rules render it quite unfit for practical use.' ,,4
Wigmore, as he himself notes, in the past has been taxed with being
"too radical, too advanced." The fact that he views many of the specific
proposals in this draft code - aside from any questions of draftstmin-
ship- as too advanced for the bench and bar at the present time is
disquieting. It affords some indication of the lack of warmth with which
the rank and file of the legal profession may be expected to view its
innovations. The Reporter doubtless will be able to defend himself and
his advisers against Mr. Wigmore's strictures, although some of them
seem by no means easy to answer. But these sharp differences of opinion
among distinguished experts and commentators illustrate forcibly the
great practical difficulties of code-making. If the legal scholars are un-
able finally to agree among themselves, what likelihood is there that they
can sell their wares to the practitioners, judges and public officials who
comprise the bulk of the legal profession?
Despite these difficulties, however, the situation is far from being
hopeless. Within recent years practicing lawyers have lost much of
their attitude of extreme conservatism toward reformation of the rules
of evidence. The researches and writings of pioneer scholars, the opinions
of progressive courts, the hostility of laymen - all these factors have
influenced their thinking. The time is probably not far distant when a
rational and simplified code of evidence will be embodied in court rules.
As Dean McCormick has aptly observed in a challenging article:
"In the other fields of procedure we have come to see that the
road of progress is the way of comparative study. By examining
the results of experiments in other states and countries, and by
selecting the devices that have proven successful in practice, a body
63. Ibid. (Italics are Wigmore's).
64. Id. at 28.
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of knowledge of scientific code-making has been developed, with
notable recent results. Comparative research and an openminded
willingness to profit by the experience of others, are the path of im-
provement in evidence law." 05
As already indicated, there would seem to be no reason why the three
groups now directly concerned with reshaping the law of evidence in
the federal courts should not meet in an earnest effort to reach a solution
of their problems.0 The task of composing inevitable clashes of opinion
calls for the exercise of judicial statesmanship of a high order. The
American Law Institute Code is a tentative draft. In order to insure
a favorable reception of its provisions, its framers would doubtless be
willing to alter it materially in the light of criticisms and suggestions
from responsible and informed sources. The acceptance or rejection
of any specific proposal should depend, in the final analysis, upon con-
siderations of expediency as well as of intrinsic merit. Wigmore's
forcible objections to the code on the score of its draftsmanship should
be carefully and objectively weighed. Reforms and innovations that
are deemed to be too extreme or doctrinaire may have to wait until a
later day.
The formulation of a code that will at once free the rules of evidence
from archaic and restrictive encumbrances, satisfy the tested needs of
experience and command the substantial support of the bench and bar
is an achievement that may well be the work of years. Meanwhile it is
probably desirable to incorporate in the Federal Rules of Court some
evidence provisions of a less thoroughgoing and definitive character.
Here Wigaore's suggestion seems to offer the most workable and satis-
factory immediate solution. He proposes that certain specific evidentiary
rules now thought to be desirable by the Supreme Court be formulated,
that the remaining scattered federal statutes be left as they are, and
that all other disputed matters, for the time being, be relegated to state
practice for conformity. His suggested rule, offered as a substitute for
Rule 43 (a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, specifies that in trials before
a jury the rules applicable to the consideration of evidence shall conform
to state law and practice, except as otherwise provided either by the
Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States, or by the Rules of
Court.0 7 The remaining provisions of Rule 43 would be left intact.
65. Tomorrow's Law of Evidcnce (1938) 24 A. B. A. J. 507, 581.
66. The Supreme Court has a continuing Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil
Procedure which is requested to prepare and submit to the Court such amendments as
they may deem advisable to the Rules already adopted. See the court order and com-
mittee report, 1 F. R. D. 79 (1940).
67. See 1 WIGMOR, EvIDENcE (3d ed. 1940) §6d for further explanation of this
suggestion. It should be noted that in addition to Rule 43, other rules deal with evi-
dence matters. See Rules 26-37, 44, 45, 46, 50, 61, 68, 80.
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The opportunity would thus be presented to the Court in the immediate
future, through its advisory groups, to introduce a greater degree of
uniformity into the federal law of evidence by formulating rules relating
to some of the more fundamental and less controversial matters, leaving
disputed points for further consideration and decision. In this con-
nection, if it were thought desirable for any reason to include in the
Rules of Criminal Procedure any special evidentiary provisions relative
to the trial of criminal cases, this could be readily accomplished. The
result would be a limited amount of codification through Rules of Court.
It would, of course, be something in the nature of a stop-gap until such
time as a complete and definitive federal code of evidence could be
agreed upon.
